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Procedural rights in criminal proceedings have been receiving considerable 
attention in the European Union’s legislative agenda of the past decade.1 The 
piecemeal approach introduced in 2009 in the Council’s Roadmap Resolution2 
has resulted in an impressive number of common minimum norms on proce-
dural rights for defendants and victims of crime, adopted under the heading 
of Article 82(2) tfeu. As to defence rights,3 six directives have been adopt-
ed between 2010 and 2016 covering the rights to interpretation and transla-
tion, the right to information (about rights, about the accusation and about 
the essential materials of the case); the right of access to a lawyer, the right to 
1 This editorial is based on a lecture given at the conference ‘Procedural rights in criminal pro-
ceedings in the EU’ which was held at Utrecht University on 13–14 September 2018, https://
www.uu.nl/en/events/conference-procedural-rights-in-criminal-proceedings-in-the-eu.
2 Resolution on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused per-
sons in criminal proceedings [2009] OJ C295/1.
3 This piece focuses on defence rights, but acknowledges the EU’s efforts in the field of vic-
tims’ rights, see e.g. Directive 2012/29 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support 
and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/jha 
[2012] OJ L315/57.
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communicate with third persons and consular authorities, the presumption 
of innocence (including the right not to incriminate oneself and the right to 
remain silent), the right to be present at trial; the right to state-paid legal aid; 
and rights specific to children who are suspected of crime.4
Considering the previous emphasis on repressive measures – such as the 
establishment of instruments for cross-border law enforcement,5  or the adop-
tion of criminal prohibitions6 – the legislative achievements in the area of 
procedural rights for defendants have been widely welcomed by practitio-
ners and academics, particularly to counterbalance the strong position of law 
enforcement authorities under the various cooperation mechanisms. From 
that perspective, the aforementioned so-called procedural rights package 
must be considered a great step forward. Moreover, since the EU increasingly 
presents itself as a fundamental rights actor, it is likely that further steps will 
follow.
But promising as this may sound, I will argue that the extent of EU compe-
tence to harmonise defence rights is too limited to justify major new steps in 
this regard, for Article 82(2) tfeu expressly envisages a functional approach 
towards approximation powers in the field of defence rights. After all, the 
4 Directive 2010/64 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings [2010] 
OJ L280/01; Directive 2012/13 on the right to information in criminal proceedings [2012] OJ 
L142/1; Directive 2013/48 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in 
European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon 
deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and with consular authorities 
while deprived of liberty [2013] OJ L294/1; Directive 2016/343 on the strengthening of certain 
aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in crimi-
nal proceedings [2016] OJ L65/1; Directive 2016/800 on procedural safeguards for children 
who are suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings [2016] OJ L132/1; and Directive 
2016/1919 on legal aid for suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings and for re-
quested persons in European arrest warrant proceedings [2016] OJ L297/1.
5 Probably most well-known is the European arrest warrant mechanism, based on Framework 
Decision 2002/584/jha on the European arrest warrant and surrender procedures between 
Member States [2002] OJ L190/1. Other instruments for instance include the European En-
forcement Order (Framework Decision 2008/909/jha on the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or mea-
sures involving deprivation of liberty [2008] OJ L327/27) and the European Investigation Or-
der (Directive 2014/41/EU regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters 
[2014] OJ L130/1).
6 Such as Directive 2014/57 on criminal sanctions for market abuse [2014] OJ L173/179, and 
Directive 2011/36 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting 
its victims [2011], L101/1.
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competence to establish common minimum norms concerning, among oth-
er things, the rights of individuals in criminal procedure can be exercised ‘to 
the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of judgment and judicial 
decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a 
cross-border dimension’. Approximation of defence rights is thus considered 
a means to an end, i.e. a means to achieve smoother cross-border cooperation 
between police and judicial authorities.7 But as the following reflections will 
demonstrate, the actual scopes of adopted EU-level defence rights fail to re-
flect the limited, functional scope of approximation powers expressed in 
Article 82(2) tfeu. Moreover, considering the specific relationship between 
approximated defence rights on the one hand, and related rights enshrined in 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter: the Charter) on the other, 
it will be shown that approximated defence rights potentially extend the Char-
ter’s applicability in the Member States, and hence provide further reason to 
question the functionalist logic reflected in Article 82(2) tfeu. To conclude, 
I will argue that Article 82(2) tfeu is too confined to respond to the demand 
for a self-standing EU policy on procedural safeguards for defendants in crimi-
nal proceedings and, hence, recommend a broader mandate in this area, al-
lowing both functional and self-standing powers.
1. Before demonstrating that the actual codifications of EU-level defence 
rights are bound to go beyond the functional approach reflected in Article 
82(2) tfeu, it must be acknowledged that the various directives that so far 
were adopted under its heading expressly endorse the functional approach to-
wards EU-level defence rights – the approach being that such common rights 
must facilitate cross-border cooperation in criminal matters. For example, the 
preamble to Directive 2016/1919 on state-funded legal aid for persons who suf-
ficient resources states that
‘[b]y establishing common minimum rules concerning the right to legal 
aid for suspects, accused persons and requested persons, this Directive 
aims to strengthen the trust of Member States in each other’s criminal 
7 Compare also the use of the term ‘functional criminalisation’, used by Mitsilegas in his in-
terpretation of Article 83 tfeu. He observes a ‘dual securitised/functional criminalisation 
approach’ and argues that the second paragraph of Article 83 reflects the functional criminal-
isation approach: ‘Rather than assuming the status of a self-standing Union policy, criminal 
law is thus perceived as a means to an end, the end being the effective implementation of 
other Union policies’. V. Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law after Lisbon. Rights, Trust and the Trans-
formation of Justice in Europe, Hart Publishing 2016, p. 57, 60.
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justice systems and thus to improve mutual recognition of decisions in 
criminal matters’ (emphasis added).8
The preamble to Directive 2013/48 on the right of access to a lawyer contains a 
wording of the same kind:
‘Common minimum rules should lead to increased confidence in the 
criminal justice systems of all Member States, which, in turn, should lead 
to more efficient judicial cooperation in a climate of mutual trust…’ (em-
phasis added).9
Considering the objective to facilitate cross-border criminal justice coopera-
tion between the Member States, it figures that the rights established in both 
of these directives also apply in surrender proceedings under the European 
arrest warrant mechanism (Article 1(1)(b) of Directive 2016/1919; Article 2(2) of 
Directive 2013/48). Once again, this confirms the strong relationship between 
approximation and effective cooperation as envisaged in Article 82(2) tfeu.
Be that as it may, there is no denying that the minimum standards on de-
fence rights established in these directives as well as in other procedural rights 
directives apply in purely domestic criminal proceedings too. Thus, in daily 
practice, it are not only suspects sought under a European arrest warrant or 
suspects whose premises have been searched under a European investiga-
tion order who under EU legislation are entitled to translations of essential 
documents in a language they understand, or to state-funded legal aid if their 
own resources are insufficient; rather, all suspects are entitled to the EU-level 
defence rights before the national authorities of the Member States – 
 irrespective of whether or not the case has a cross-border dimension. This can-
not surprise, for it would be practically impossible to draw a clear distinction 
between cross-border cases and domestic cases. As a consequence, the impact 
of approximated safeguards for defendants in criminal proceedings naturally 
goes beyond the cross-border context.
What strikes more is that in some of the preambles, the objective to foster 
cross-border cooperation is accompanied by a second objective which sug-
gests an express choice for applying harmonised defence rights to all criminal 
proceedings, including purely domestic proceedings. This is best illustrated by 
citing once more from the preamble to Directive 2013/48. Besides reflecting a 
8 Recital 2 of the preamble to Directive 2016/1919, [2016] OJ L297/1.
9 Recital 8 of the preamble to Directive 2013/48, [2013] OJ L294/2.
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functional approach to the approximation of defence rights in the EU,10 this 
preamble also seems to promote a more self-standing view on common de-
fence rights, aiming at a strong level of protection for individuals involved in 
criminal proceedings across the EU:
‘Common minimum rules should lead to increased confidence in the 
criminal justice systems of all Member States, which, in turn, should lead 
to more efficient judicial cooperation in a climate of mutual trust and 
to the promotion of a fundamental rights culture in the Union’ (emphasis 
added).11
It could be argued that such a self-standing view was already reflected in the 
Council’s Roadmap Resolution in which it was stated that
‘[e]fforts should be deployed to strengthen procedural guarantees and 
the respect of the rule of law in criminal proceedings, no matter where 
citizens decide to travel, study, work or live in the European Union’.12
EU legislative measures thus establish a broad scope of application of pro-
cedural rights for defendants; not only are defence rights bound to apply in 
purely domestic criminal cases too, but the motives given for the approxima-
tion of defence rights suggest the explicit pursuit of making procedural rights 
also applicable beyond cross-border cooperation proceedings. Hence, the EU’s 
legislative achievements in the field of procedural rights only partially reflect 
the functional approximation powers stipulated in Article 82(2) tfeu. As apt-
ly noted by Caeiro, these achievements reveal ‘an autonomous, self-designed 
project for the protection of individual rights in criminal proceedings before 
the authorities of the Member States’.13 Both Caeiro and Mitsilegas have ar-
gued that this constitutes a paradigm shift in the EU criminal justice area.14
10 See n 9 and accompanying text.
11 See n 9.
12 See n 2, at preamble, recital 10.
13 P. Caeiro, ‘Introduction (or: Every Criminal Procedure Starts with a Bill of Rights)’, in: 
P. Caeiro et al (eds.), The European Union Agenda on Procedural Safeguards for Suspects or 
Accused Persons: the ‘second wave’ and its predictable impact on Portuguese law, Instituto 
Juridico, Faculdade de Direito, Universidade de Coimbra 2015, p. 17.
14 Caeiro 2015 , ibid: ‘…it is legitimate to see a “shift” in the direction of the European policy 
in this realm’. Mitsilegas 2016, n 7, p. 183: ‘the construction of Europe’s area of criminal 
justice has moved from a paradigm privileging the interests of the state and of law en-
forcement under a system of quasi-automatic mutual recognition to a paradigm where 
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True, it concerns a development that for obvious reasons must be wel-
comed15 and, furthermore, generally fits the increased attention for fundamen-
tal rights protection in the institutional legal framework of the EU under the 
Lisbon Treaty. For the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter) has now 
full legal effect (Article 6(1) teu) and the EU has committed to accede to the 
echr (Article 6(2) teu). Moreover, respect for human rights has been recog-
nised as a foundational value of the EU (Article 2 teu).16 But notwithstanding 
the positive side of this paradigm shift, it should not be ignored that a self-
standing17 body of EU procedural rights cannot legitimately be realized under 
the too limited functionalist scope of Article 82(2) tfeu. The provision is not 
fit for today’s European Union which in matters of criminal justice currently 
presents itself as a values-based actor, leading to both repressive and – to an 
increasing extent – protective criminal law measures.
2. But there is more reason to criticize the functionalist logic reflected in 
Article 82(2) tfeu. It regards the relationship between procedural rights stip-
ulated in directives and related rights protected under the Charter, and the 
consequences of this relationship. As clearly follows from the texts of the di-
rectives themselves, the various procedural rights fall under the scope of Char-
ter Rights. To be precise, provisions in procedural rights directives regulate in 
a clearer and/or into greater detail what the scope of a Charter right entails, 
and, sometimes, mention an express objective to enhance the minimum level 
of protection safeguarded under the echr and the, till then, corresponding 
level of protection under the Charter.18 For example, the preamble to Directive 
2013/48 on the right of access to a lawyer – relating to the right to a fair trial ex 
Article 47 of the Charter – states that
the rights of individuals affected by such system are brought to the fore, protected and 
enforced in EU law’.
15 See e.g. J. Ouwerkerk, ‘Criminal Justice Beyond National Sovereignty. An Alternative Per-
spective on the Europeanisation of Criminal Law’, European Journal of Crime, Criminal 
Law and Criminal Justice (23) 2015–1, p. 11–31.
16 Further on this development, see G. de Búrca, ‘The Road Not Taken: The EU as a Global 
Human Rights Actor’, The American Journal of International Law (105) 2011, p. 649–693.
17 The term ‘self-standing’ is borrowed from Mitsilegas, who uses the term to contrast the 
criminalisation approach reflected in Article 83(1) tfeu with the functionalist criminali-
sation approach under Article 83(2) tfeu, see Mitsilegas 2016, n 7. The dual approach he 
perceives in Article 83 tfeu, has been defined in more specific terms, i.e. the ‘securitised/
functional criminalisation approach’, Mitsilegas 2016, n 7, p. 57–62.
18 For in line with Article 52(3) of the Charter, rights corresponding to echr rights have the 
same meaning and scope as those echr rights, unless it is clarified (through legislation 
or through cjeu case law) that the Charter provides more extensive protection.
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‘[s]trengthening mutual trust requires detailed rules on the protection of 
the procedural rights and guarantees arising from the Charter, the echr 
and the iccpr. It also requires, by means of this Directive and by means 
of other measures, further development within the Union of the minimum 
standards set out in the Charter and in the echr’ (emphasis added).19
Directive 2012/13 on the right to information illustrates this too. The rights en-
shrined in this Directive directly relate to Articles 47 (right to a fair trial) and 
48 (respect for the rights of the defence) of the Charter. In this regard, its pre-
amble states that
‘[s]trengthening mutual trust requires detailed rules on the protection of 
the procedural rights and guarantees arising from the Charter and from 
the echr’ (emphasis added).20
Procedural rights directives thus clarify, and sometimes also enhance the 
scopes of related Charter rights. For instance, in the post-Salduz era it was for 
long still a matter for discussion whether ECtHR case law on fair trial rights 
unequivocally required national authorities to allow suspects to have a law-
yer present and participating at all hearings, and thus it was also debatable 
whether such an obligation would follow from Article 47 of the Charter. But 
the express recognition (in Article 3(3) of Directive 2013/48) of the right to 
have a lawyer present and participating during questioning at least clarifies 
the contents of the right of access to a lawyer under Article 47 of the Charter.
Then – and here comes the reason to question the mere functionalist view 
on approximation of procedural rights – as an intriguing side effect, directives 
in this field significantly enlarge the scope of application of the Charter. Pursu-
ant to Article 51 of the Charter, its provisions are only addressed to the Member 
States ‘when they are implementing Union law’. Up until recently, this provi-
sion clearly excluded the majority of domestic criminal cases, such as single 
theft cases, or cases of single rape committed against adults. In most of such 
cases, no link to Union law existed and therefore suspects could not rely in 
Charter rights in such cases. But with the implementation of procedural rights 
adopted in directives which aim to clarify and/or enhance the scope of Charter 
rights, the amount of criminal cases in which a link to Union law somehow ex-
ists has substantially been increased – not in the least because of the very fact 
that the harmonised procedural rights apply in all criminal cases, including 
19 Recital 6 of the preamble to Directive 2013/48, [2013] OJ L294/2.
20 Recital 8 of the preamble to Directive 2012/13, [2012] OJ L 142/1.





european journal of crime, criminal law and criminal justice 27 (2019) 89-96
the purely domestic cases. EU-wide procedural rights thus have a progressive 
effect on the Charter’s scope of application - an effect that constitutes an ad-
ditional reason to declare the functionalist view of Article 82(2) tfeu unfit for 
today’s European criminal justice area.
3. This editorial has attempted to demonstrate that under the legislative 
powers for functional approximation of procedural rights – i.e. approximation 
with the objective to foster police and judicial cooperation – EU legislation 
practically establishes a body of law that only partially fulfills the functional ob-
jectives envisaged in Article 82(2) tfeu, and to a large part fulfills self-standing 
objectives rooted in the fundamental norms and values the EU is based on 
(Article 2 tfeu). Considering the increased attention in the EU for the pro-
tection and strengthening of democratic values and fundamental rights, the 
functional scope of Article 82(2) tfeu is too confined and too one-sided to 
develop a self-standing EU policy on procedural safeguards for individuals in 
criminal proceedings. Hence, approximation powers in this field should reflect 
both functional and self-standing views on the advancement of procedural 
rights. Such would perhaps also pave the way for considering the adoption of 
procedural safeguards on matters that currently fall outside the scope of crimi-
nal proceedings as such, yet concern highly relevant and topical matters, such 
as detention rights.
Downloaded from Brill.com08/29/2019 09:04:19AM
via Leiden University
